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I Introduction
Connections appear to be helpful in many contexts such as obtaining a job, a promotion,
a grant, a loan or publishing a paper.1 Two main reasons help explain these wide-ranging
effects. On one hand, connections may convey information on candidates, projects and
papers. Connections then help recruiters, juries and editors make better decisions. On
the other hand, decision-makers may unduly favor connected candidates, leading to worse
decisions.2 These two reasons have opposite welfare implications and empirical researchers
have been trying to tease out the different forces behind connections’ impacts. Almost
all existing studies do so by building measures of candidates’ “true” quality. Researchers
then compare the quality of connected and unconnected promoted candidates. Informa-
tion effects likely dominate if connected promoted candidates have higher quality; favors
likely dominate if connected promoted candidates have lower quality. For instance, articles
published in top economics and finance journals by authors connected to editors tend to
receive more citations, a sign that editors use their connections to identify better papers
Brogaard, Engelberg & Parsons (2014). By contrast, Full Professors in Spain who were
connected to members of their promotion jury publish less after promotion Zinovyvea &
Bagues (2015), consistent with favoritism.
This empirical strategy, while widely used, faces three important limitations. First,
building a measure of true quality may not be easy or feasible. Looking at researchers’
publications or articles’ citations requires a long enough time lag following promotion or
publication. And such measures are in any case imperfect proxies of quality. Second,
identification is only valid if the impact of promotion on measured quality is the same
for connected and unconnected promoted candidates, see e.g. Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015,
p.283). This assumption is critical but not necessarily plausible, and can generally not
be tested. Third, connections may convey both information and favors. This empirical
1The literature on jobs and connections is large and expanding. Recent references include Beaman &
Magruder (2012), Brown, Setren & Topa (2016), Hensvik & Skans (2016), Pallais & Sands (2016). On
promotions, see Combes, Linnemer & Visser (2008), Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015). On grants, see Li (2017).
On loans, see Engelberg, Gao & Parsons (2012). On publications, see Brogaard, Engelberg & Parsons
(2014), Colussi (2017), Laband & Piette (1994).
2Favor exchange within a group might increase the group’s welfare at the detriment of society, see
Bramoulle´ & Goyal (2016). In this paper, we focus on the immediate negative implications of favoritism.
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strategy may allow researchers to identify which effect dominates; it does not allow them
to estimate their relative strengths.3
We develop a new method to identify why connections matter, building on earlier work
on discrimination. Our method addresses these limitations. It does not rely on measures of
true quality. Rather, it exploits classical data collected at time of promotion: information
on candidates and whether they were promoted. It allows researchers to estimate the mag-
nitudes of the two effects. The method does require exogenous shocks on connections. This
is, in any case, a precondition of any study of the reasons behind the effect of connections.
The method is indirect and looks for revealing signs of information and favors on the
relation between candidates’ observables and promotion. Consider candidates applying
for promotion. They are evaluated by a jury and some candidates are connected to jury
members. When connections convey information, the jury has an extra signal on connected
candidates’ ability. This signal is unobserved by the econometrician and could be positive
or negative. To the econometrician, then, the promotion decision looks more random for
connected candidates.4 We show how the strength of the information channel can be
recovered, under appropriate assumptions, from this excess variance in the latent error of
connected candidates. To recover favors, then, we estimate and compare the promotion
thresholds faced by connected and unconnected candidates. Favors lead to systematic biases
in evaluation and the difference between promotion thresholds measures the magnitude of
the underlying favors.
Our econometric framework is based on normality assumptions. We make use of pro-
bit models with heteroscedasticity to detect and estimate excess variance. We clarify the
conditions under which favors and information are identified. Identification fails to hold if
the effects depend in an arbitrary way on candidates’ observables (Proposition 1). Iden-
tification holds, however, under slight restrictions on this dependence, for instance in the
presence of an exclusion restriction or under linearity assumptions (Theorem 1).
We then bring our method to data. We reanalyze the data on academic promotions in
3In a context of grant applications, Li (2016) develops a new method to recover the respective strengths
of favors and information. Her method relies on measures of true quality and on jury evaluations.
4A similar idea underlies Theorem 4 in Lu (2016); we discuss this relation in more detail below.
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Spain assembled by Manuel Bagues and Natalya Zinovyeva, Zinoveyva & Bagues (2015).
This data contain information on all candidates to promotion to Associate and Full Profes-
sor in the Spanish academic system between 2002 and 2006. To be promoted, candidates
had to pass a highly competitive exam at the national level. They were evaluated by a jury
whose members were picked at random in a pool of eligible evaluators, providing exogenous
shocks on connections. The data contain information on six types of connections between
candidates and evaluators, classified in weak and strong. From data at time of promotion,
Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015) estimate the causal impacts of connections. They find positive
and significant impacts of both weak and strong ties on promotion for candidates at both
the Associate and Full Professor level.
We investigate the reasons behind these impacts on the same data. We estimate differ-
ent versions of our model. Empirical results depict a coherent, and intuitive, picture. We
find strong evidence of information effects associated with both weak and strong ties at
the Associate Professor level, when the uncertainty on candidates’ academic ability is still
strong. We do not detect favors associated with weak ties at that level. By contrast, we
find that strong ties also generate favors and that these dominate information effects quan-
titatively. We do not detect information effect at the Full Professor level, when uncertainty
on candidates is low. We detect strong favors associated with both weak and strong ties
at that level, consistent with generalized favor exchange in the Spanish academic system
at the time. These results, obtained through our method from data at time of promotion,
are consistent with results obtained through quality measures collected five years after
promotion, see Section VI.
Our analysis contributes to a growing empirical literature on the effects of connections.
We develop the first empirical method able to identify favors and information from classical
data collected at time of promotion and apply it to analyze academic promotions in Spain.
This method could be applied in many other contexts, and could be used to cross-validate
results obtained from quality measures.
Our analysis builds on, and advances, ideas first identified in the literature on dis-
crimination. Heckman & Siegelman (1993) and Heckman (1998) clarify key implications of
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differences in unobservable’ variances across groups. They show that differences in vari-
ances invalidate the use of standard models of binary outcomes to detect discrimination.
Their critique apply to major empirical studies on discrimination, such as Bertrand & Mul-
lainathan (2004). Neumark (2012) shows how probit models with heteroscedasticity can
help address this issue. He reanalyzes the data from Bertrand & Mullainathan (2004) and
finds stronger evidence for race discrimination than in the original study, once difference in
variances across racial groups are accounted for. We adapt and extend these ideas to the
study of connections. We show that differences in variances help identify the informational
content of connections, an idea consistent with Theorem 4 in Lu (2016). Lu (2016) provides
a theoretical analysis of random choice under private information. He shows that better
private information generates choices that look more dispersed from the point of view of
the econometrician. We provide, to our knowledge, the first applied implementation of this
insight. We obtain novel identification results. The first part of Theorem 1, on exclusion
restrictions, formalizes and extends the identification argument of Neumark (2012). The
second part of Theorem 2, on linearity, is new and shows that identification may hold even
without exclusion restrictions. We provide the first empirical application of these ideas to
the study of the impact of connections.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section illustrates the identification strategy
with the help of a simple model. Section III introduces the general model and establishes
formal identification results. Section IV presents the data. Section V discusses key fea-
tures of the empirical implementation. Section VI presents empirical results. Section VII
concludes.
II A simple model
In this Section, we introduce a simple model to explain and illustrate our identification
strategy.5 We develop our general model and derive formal identification results in Section
III.
5This model is similar to models analyzed in Heckman & Siegelman (1993, Appendix 5.D), Neumark
(2012) and Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015, Section I).
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Candidates apply for promotion. A jury evaluates candidates and makes promotion
decisions. We assume that the jury grades candidates and that candidates with higher
grades are promoted.6 These grades may be affected by connections to jury members, as
described below. Let ae be the exam-specific promotion threshold: a candidate is promoted
iff her grade is higher than or equal to ae. This threshold may notably depend on the
number of candidates applying for promotion in that wave and discipline.
We assume that candidate i’s true ability ai can be decomposed in three parts:
ai = xiβ + ui + vi (1)
where xi ∈ Rm denotes a vector of m characteristics observed by the econometrician and
the jury, ui is unobserved by both the econometrician and the jury, and vi is observed by
the jury but not the econometrician. In our empirical application, xi includes number of
publications, age and gender; ui could capture creativity and vi the performance at the
exam. Without loss of generality, we assume that E(ui|xi) = E(vi|xi) = 0.7 Thus, ui and
vi represent parts of unobserved characteristics that cannot be explained by observables.
Assume further that E(ui|vi) = 0 and that unobservables are normally distributed: ui ∼
N(0, σ2u) and vi ∼ N(0, σv). Denote by Φ the cumulative density function of a normal
variable with mean 0 and variance 1.
Consider an unconnected candidate first. We assume that her grade is equal to the
jury’s expectation of her ability E(ai|xi, vi) = xiβ + vi. Thus, unconnected candidate i is
promoted iff xiβ + vi ≥ ae. From the econometrician’s point of view, the probability that
an unconnected candidate with characteristics xi is promoted is equal to:
pu(yi = 1|xi) = Φ(xiβ − ae
σv
) (2)
where yi = 1 if candidate i obtains the promotion and 0 otherwise.
6We develop our approach under the assumption that the econometrician does not have data on jury
evaluations.
7If E(ui|xi) 6= 0, define uˆi = ui − E(ui|xi) and similarly for vˆi. Note that E(uˆi|xi) = 0 while E(ui|xi)
is a function of xi. Under linearity, this yields ai = xiβˆ+ uˆi + vˆi, which is then equivalent to equation (1).
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Next, consider a connected candidate. We make two simplifying assumptions in this
Section. We assume, first, that being connected to the jury is random. In the empirical
application, this holds conditional on the expected numbers of connections, see Section IV.
This implies that connected and unconnected candidates have the same distributions of
observables and unobservables. Second, we neglect issues related to the number and types
of connections. These issues are accounted for in our general model, see Section III.
Being connected to the jury has two distinct impacts on grades. On the one hand, the
jury has some additional information on the candidate’s ability. We assume that the jury
observes a noisy signal θi = ui + εi where εi ∼ N(0, σ2ε), and updates his belief on the
candidate’s ability based on this additional information. On the other hand, the jury may
want to favor the connected candidate. We assume that favors take the shape of a grade
premium B due to connections.
A connected candidate’s grade is thus equal to its expected ability E(ai|xi, vi, si) =
xiβ + E(ui|θi) + vi plus the bias from favors B. Since E(ui|θi) = σ2uσ2u+σ2ε θi, connected
candidate i is hired iff xiβ +
σ2u
σ2u+σ
2
ε
θi + vi + B ≥ ae. From the econometrician’s point of
view, the signal θi enters in the latent error and generates extra variance on the jury’s
decision. Variance of the latent error is now equal to σ2v +
σ4u
σ2u+σ
2
ε
. Let σ2 = 1+ σ
4
u
σ2v(σ
2
u+σ
2
ε)
> 1
denote the excess variance of the latent error compared to unconnected candidates. This
yields:
pc(yi = 1|xi) = Φ(xiβ +B − ae
σσv
) (3)
Comparing equations (2) and (3), we see that information and favors have different im-
pacts on the probability to be promoted. When a jury has better information on connected
candidates, this reduces the magnitude of the impact of observable characteristics on the
likelihood to be promoted. By contrast, favors lead to a shift in the effective promotion
threshold, from ae to ae −B, leaving the impact of observables unchanged.
We illustrate these effects in Figure 1. The solid black curve depicts pu(yi = 1|xi),
the probability that an unconnected candidate is promoted as function of observed ability.
The dashed curve depicts the probability that a connected candidate is promoted when
information effects only are present. Note that the whole curve is less steep. The observed
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probability to be promoted varies less with observed ability. Formally, an increase in σ
leads to a second-order stochastic dominance shift of the whole curve. This also implies
that the apparent impact of connections is negative for very good candidates for which
xiβ ≥ ae. This apparent negative impact is due to an asymmetry in the effects of good
and bad news on candidates’ unobservables. While good news do not improve already good
chances by much, bad news significantly reduce the chances of good candidates. For the
econometrician, connections then reduce the observed probability to be promoted for very
good candidates.
The short-dashed curve depicts the probability that a connected candidate is promoted
when only favors are present. The curve is now translated to the left, inducing a first-
order stochastic dominance shift. The shape of the whole curve is preserved. The apparent
impact of connections is now positive for all candidates. Finally, the grey curve depicts
pc(yi = 1|xi) when both effects are present.
Figure 1: Effects of a connection
ae-B ae x
1
p(h=1|x)
Unconnected
Connected : information
Connected : favors
Connected : information + favors
Both effects can thus be identified from data on promotion.8 Differences in the impacts
of observables between connected and unconnected can be used to recover information ef-
fects. Differences in estimated promotion thresholds between connected and unconnected
can then be used to recover favors. From an econometric point of view, the differential in-
formation that the jury has on connected candidates generates a form of heteroscedasticity.
8Formally, identification in this model holds under the standard assumption that σv = 1 and is a direct
consequence of Theorem 1 below.
7
The latent error has a higher variance for connected than for unconnected. This property
allows us to rely on standard techniques developed to analyze heteroscedasticity in probit
estimations in our empirical analysis below.
To sum up, both information and favors can be identified from data on promotion in
a simple model where the two effects are constant. We extend this model and develop our
econometric framework in the next Section.
III Identification
We now develop our general framework. We maintain the assumption that connections
are random and extend the simple model in three directions. We incorporate baseline
heteroscedasticity, varying information and varying favors. Information and favors may
notably depend on the number and types of connections of a candidate to the jury. In
line with the empirical application, we consider two types here - strong and weak ties; the
framework and results easily extend to a finite number of types. Denote by niS and niW
the number of strong and weak ties that candidate i has to the jury.
We first assume that the variance of vi may depend on i’s observables xi. Thus,
vi ∼ N(0, σ2v(xi)). In the empirical analysis, we adopt standard assumptions regarding
heteroscedasticity in probit regressions, see Section IV. To state our identification results
below, we only require that such baseline heteroscedasticity does not raise identification
problems in classical probit estimations. More precisely, consider unconnected candidates.
We have: p(yi = 1|niS = niW = 0,xi) = Φ[(xiβ − ae)/σv(xi)]. We assume that β and σv(.)
are identified from the sample of unconnected candidates.9
Second, we assume that the private signal received by the jury on a connected candidate
may depend on the candidate’s number and types of connections and on his other observable
characteristics. Denote by σ ≥ 1 the excess variance generated by this signal. We now have
σ = σ(niS, niW ,xi) where, by assumption, σ(0, 0,xi) = 1. Third, the bias from favors B
9As is well-know, a probit model with coefficients (β, ae) and variance σv(xi) cannot be distinguished
from one with coefficients (λβ, λae) and variance λσv. We therefore adopt the classical normalization
assumption that σv(0) = 1 in our econometric specifications.
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may also depend on the number and types of links and on the candidate’s characteristics:
B = B(niS, niW ,xi), with B(0, 0,xi) = 0. While we generally expect both σ and B to be
increasing in the number of connections, we do not impose it in what follows. This yields
the following probability to be hired, conditional on connections and observables:
p(yi = 1|niS, niW ,xi) = Φ[xiβ +B(niS, niW ,xi)− ae
σv(xi)σ(niS, niW ,xi)
] (4)
The simple model presented in Section II is a particular case with σv(xi) = σv, and
B(niS, niW ,xi) = B and σ(niS, niW ,xi) = σ as soon as niS + niW ≥ 1.
Under which conditions is this general model identified? Note that our identification
strategy will not work without some form of restriction on B(.) and σ(.). If the bias B varies
with observable xki in a direction opposite from the direct effect βk, this leads to an apparent
reduction in the impact of xki on the likelihood to be promoted for connected. If this
happens on all observables and without further restrictions, it prevents the identification
of the information effect. We next state this negative result and derive a formal proof in
the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Consider model (4). Suppose that the precision of the signals conveyed by
connections and the bias from favors depend in an arbitrary way on connections and on
other observable characteristics of candidates. Then, favors and information effects cannot
be identified from data on promotion only.
We now derive our main result. We show that identification holds under mild restrictions
on bias and excess variance. We consider two types of restrictions: exclusion restrictions
and parametric assumptions.
Theorem 1 Consider model (4).
(Exclusion restriction). Suppose that characteristic k leaves σ and B unaffected and that
βk 6= 0. Then, the model is identified and the functions σ(niS, niW ,x−ki ) and B(niS, niW ,x−ki )
are non-parametrically identified.
(Linearity). Suppose that ln(σ(niS, niW ,xi)) = δ(niS, niW )xi and B(niS, niW ,xi) = γ0(niS, niW )+
γ1(niS, niW )xi, with γ0(0, 0) = 0 and δ(0, 0) = γ1(0, 0) = 0. Then, the model is identified
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and the functions δ(niS, niW ), γ0(niS, niW ) and γ1(niS, niW ) are non-parametrically identi-
fied.
To see why the first part of Theorem 1 holds, suppose that σ and B do not de-
pend on xki . From data on the unconnected, we can recover βk, the direct effect of x
k
i
on grade, and σv(.). Focus, then on candidates with number of connections niS and niW
and with other characteristics x−ki . From data on these candidates, we can recover the
heteroscedasticity-corrected impact of xki on grade, equal to βk/σ(niS, niW ,x
−k
i ). If βk 6= 0,
we obtain σ(niS, niW ,x
−k
i ). The bias B(niS, niW ,x
−k
i ) can then be obtained as the difference
in inferred promotion thresholds between unconnected candidates and candidates with ties
niS and niW and characteristics x
−k
i .
Therefore, our identification strategy operates as long as one exclusion restriction is
present in the model. As with instrumental variables, the excluded variable should have a
direct impact on the unconnected likelihood to be promoted and should not directly affect
the precision of the signals conveyed by connections nor the bias from favors they may
generate. In particular, a model where excess variance and bias from favors depend on
connections but not on other observables is identified. We estimate several variants of such
models in the empirical analysis below.
Even without exclusion restrictions, the model can still be identified thank to functional
form assumptions. The second part of Theorem 1, proved in Appendix, shows that this
notably holds when excess variance is log linear in observables while bias is an affine
function of observables. In this case, again, dependence on connections can be arbitrary and
is fully identified. To achieve non-parametric identification in practice may of course require
a very large number of observations. In the empirical analysis below, we adopt standard
parametric assumptions on the way ln(σ) and B vary with connections and observables.
All models estimated in Section VI are covered by Theorem 1.
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IV Data
We apply our framework to the data on academic promotions in Spain assembled and
studied by Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015). We describe the main features of the data here and
refer to their study for details. From 2002 to 2006, academics in Spain seeking promotion
to Associate Professor (profesor titular) or Full Professor (catedra´tico) first had to qualify
in a national exam (habilitac´ion). All candidates in the same discipline in a given wave
were evaluated by a common jury composed of 7 members. The jury had to allocate a
predetermined number of positions. These exams were highly competitive and obtaining
the national qualification essentially ensured promotion. A central feature of this system
was that jury members were picked at random from a pool of eligible evaluators. The
random draw was actually carried out by Ministry officials using urns and balls. The data
contains information on all candidates to academic promotion during that period, their
connections to eligible evaluators and to jury members, and their success or failure in the
national exam.
Overall, there are 31, 243 applications to 967 exams: 17, 799 applications to 465 exams
for Associate Professor (AP) positions and 13, 444 to 502 exams for Full Professor (FP)
positions. We have information on candidates’ demographics and academic outcomes at
time of application. Observable characteristics include gender, age, whether the candidate
obtained his PhD in Spain, the number of publications, the number of publications weighted
by journal quality, the number of PhD students supervised, the number of PhD committees
of which the candidate had been a member, and the number of previous attempts at
promotion. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. Standards regarding research outputs
may of course differ between disciplines. To analyze applications in a common framework,
we follow Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015) and normalize research indicators to have mean 0
and variance 1 within exams.10 The data also contain information on six types of links
between candidates and evaluators. We adopt Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015)’s classification
of these links in strong and weak ties.11 A candidate is said to have strong ties to his
10We also normalize age and past experience to have mean 0 within exams.
11The data also contains information on indirect connections, for instance when a candidate and an
evaluator have a common member on their PhD committees. Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015) do not find any
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics: Observables
All AP FP Eng. H&L Sci. Soc. Sci.
Female 0.34 0.40 0.27 0.21 0.45 0.30 0.39
(0.47) (0.49) (0.44) (0.41) (0.50) (0.46) (0.49)
Age 41.21 37.49 46.14 38.74 41.86 41.97 40.39
(7.59) (6.41) (6.06) (7.07) (7.62) (7.55) (7.54)
PhD in Spain 0.78 0.83 0.70 0.83 0.77 0.76 0.78
(0.42) (0.37) (0.46) (0.38) (0.42) (0.43) (0.42)
Past Experience 0.81 0.73 0.91 0.85 0.63 0.89 0.88
(1.27) (1.27) (1.26) (1.36) (0.94) (1.40) (1.30)
Publications 12.84 8.12 19.09 7.76 11.45 16.99 9.22
(18.31) (14.06) (21.18) (12.88) (11.39) (24.10) (11.61)
AIS 0.72 0.70 0.74 0.52 - 0.80 0.62
(0.53) (0.57) (0.48) (0.37) - (0.51) (0.75)
PhD Students 1.00 0.24 2.00 0.83 0.61 1.45 0.66
(2.11) (0.88) (2.75) (1.61) (1.63) (2.60) (1.58)
PhD Committees 3.61 0.88 7.23 2.40 3.04 4.81 2.67
(6.76) (2.55) (8.65) (4.42) (5.99) (8.21) (4.99)
Observations 31243 17799 13444 4783 9005 12858 4597
Notes: Average values of the observable characteristics at the time of exam. Standard deviation in
parentheses. FP and AP stand for exams for Full Professor and Associate Professor positions respectively.
Eng., H&L, Sci., and Soc. Sci. are abbreviations for Engineering, Humanities and Law, Sciences, and Social
Sciences, which are 4 broad scientific areas in our sample. AIS is the sum of international publications
weighted by corresponding Article Influence Scores. The table partially replicates Table 2 in Zinovyeva &
Bagues (2015).
PhD advisor, to his coauthors and to his colleagues. He has weak ties with members of his
PhD committee, with members of the PhD committees of his PhD students and with other
members of the PhD committees of which he was a member.12 Overall, 34.8% of candidates
end up having at least one strong connection with a member of their jury and 20.6% have
at least one weak connection. Table 2 provides further information on connections.
effect of indirect connections and we do not include them in our analysis.
12A connection which is both strong and weak is classified as strong.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Connections
All AP FP Eng. H&L Sci. Soc. Sci.
Strong connections 31.71 29.08 35.18 37.78 27.65 31.13 34.94
Advisor 3.17 2.97 3.43 4.60 3.29 2.43 3.50
Coauthor 5.44 3.26 8.32 6.10 2.84 7.44 4.24
Colleague 29.71 27.74 32.31 36.02 26.15 28.50 33.46
Weak connections 18.79 7.33 33.97 17.06 23.63 16.43 17.71
PhD committee member 7.08 5.31 9.43 8.05 10.22 4.39 7.48
PhD committee of his PhD student 4.45 0.69 9.42 4.70 4.81 4.27 3.96
Same PhD committee member 11.65 1.82 24.66 8.84 13.90 11.59 10.31
Notes: The percentage of candidates with at least one connection to the jury. The table partially replicates
Table 3 in Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015).
V Empirical Implementation
We now apply our identification strategy to the data on academic promotions in Spain. We
discuss three key features of the empirical implementation: the random assignment of eval-
uators; the exam-specific promotion thresholds; and the specific models being estimated.
A Random assignment of jury members
Our identification result, Theorem 1, relies on the assumption that the distribution of
unobservables for candidates with connections (niS, niW ) does not depend (niS, niW ). In
the data, random assignment of jury members ensures that this holds conditionally on the
expected number of connections to the jury. That is, candidates may vary in the extent
of their connections to eligible evaluators. From the number of eligible evaluators and the
numbers of weak and strong ties to eligible evaluators, we can simply compute the expected
number of actual connections of the candidate to the jury. Conditional on these expected
numbers, actual numbers of connections are random. We present the corresponding balance
tests in Table 3.13 Controlling for candidates’ expected numbers of connections, we do
not find significant correlations between observable characteristics and actual number of
13To be consistent with our main regressions, we run balance tests conditioning directly on the expected
numbers of connections. By contrast, Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015) control for expected connections through
an extensive set of dummies, see Table 4 p.278. Incorporating these dummies raise computational issues in
our non-linear setup. Results from Table 1 show that even in a simple linear formulation, actual connections
are uncorrelated with observable characteristics.
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Table 3: Balance tests
AIS Publications PhD PhD Past
students committees experience
Without controls for the expected number of connections
Strong 0.009 0.010 −0.017∗∗∗ −0.012∗ 0.009
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Weak 0.007 0.051∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007)
Including controls for the expected number of connections
Strong −0.001 −0.011 0.002 −0.006 −0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Weak −0.005 −0.008 0.013 0.010 0.003
(0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012)
Observations 31243 31243 31243 31243 31243
Notes: Results of 10 regressions of observables (columns) on the number of strong and weak connections to
the jury (rows). In regressions in the upper panel we do not control for the expected number of connections.
Regressions in lower panel include controls for the expected number of strong connections to the jury and
the expected number of weak connections to the jury. OLS estimates. Standard errors clustered on the
exam level are in the parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
connections. Therefore, a conditional version of Theorem 1 holds in this context. The
probability to be promoted for unconnected p(yi = 1|niS = niW = 0, EniS, EniW ,xi),
excess variance due to better information σ(niS, niW , EniS, EniW ,xi) and bias from favors
B(niS, niW , EniS, EniW ,xi) may depend on the expected numbers of connections to the
jury. Under the assumptions underlying Theorem 1, the conditional information and favor
effects are identified. Note that the expected numbers of connections represent measures
of social capital, built from information available to the jury. In the empirical analysis we
therefore simply include them in the set of candidates’ characteristics observable to the
jury.
B Exam-specific promotion thresholds
Our approach relies on exam-specific promotion thresholds. This is an important element
since the bias from favors is identified from differences in promotion thresholds between
connected and unconnected candidates. We consider two ways to account for exam-specific
thresholds empirically: exam fixed effects ae and exam grouped effects ae = zea, where ze is
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a vector of exam-level characteristics. A first approach is to include a full set of exam fixed
effects. In practice, regressions then include 967 exam dummies. While exam fixed effects
impose, in principle, less restrictions, they raise several problems in practice. They may
not be identified for exams with small numbers of candidates, due to full predictability.
They raise computational difficulties caused by the high dimensionality of the non-linear
optimization problem to be solved in the estimations. And in circumstances where grouped
effects are appropriate, estimations based on fixed effects may be inefficient.
Alternatively, we consider exam grouped effects as in Bester & Hansen (2016). We
allow promotion thresholds to depend on type, area and wave fixed effects - leading to
72 dummies in total - and on the number of candidates, the number of positions, the
proportion of filled positions and the proportion of unconnected candidates. This model
is of course nested in the model with exam fixed effects and we can then test whether it
leads to a significant loss in explanatory power.
C Econometric model
In the empirical analysis, we estimate different specifications of model (4). The general
model features three key ingredients: baseline heteroscedasticity σv(xi), excess variance
from better information σ(niS, niW ,xi) and bias from favors B(niS, niW ,xi). Note that the
first two elements are closely related, since σv(xi)σ(niS, niW ,xi) represents the variance of
the latent errror for candidates with connections niS, niW and characteristics xi.
We adopt a standard formulation for baseline heteroscedasticity, see Woolridge (2010).
We assume that the logarithm of the variance of vi, the determinant of ability of uncon-
nected candidates observed by the jury but not by the econometrician, is a linear function
of observable characteristics:
σv(xi) = exp(δxi) (5)
and where the constant is excluded from the xi’s. To gain in statistical and computational
efficiency, we do not include all characteristics in σv in our preferred specification. We
present our estimation procedure in Appendix.
We model information effects by building on this heteroscedasticity formulation. We
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consider increasingly complex specifications: (1) constant information effects σ(niS, niW ,xi) =
exp(δc) if niS + niW ≥ 1; (2) information effects depending on numbers and types of
links: σ(niS, niW ,xi) = exp(δSniS + δWniW ); and (3) information effects depending on
numbers and types of links as well as other observable characteristics: σ(niS, niW ,xi) =
exp[(δSxi)niS + (δWxi)niW ]. Thus, each new strong tie with the jury increases latent error
variance by exp(δS) in formulation (2) and by exp(δSxi) in formulation (3). These assump-
tions allow us to study the determinants of the variance of the latent error in a common,
coherent framework. In addition, observe that formulation (3) can be obtained as the first
element of the Taylor approximation of ln(σ(niS, niW ,xi)/σv(xi)) with respect to niS, niW
and xi, for any function σ.
We also model increasingly complex specifications of the bias from favors: (1) constant
bias: B(niS, niW ,xi) = B if niS +niW ≥ 1; (2) bias depending on the numbers and types of
links, linearly: B(niS, niW ,xi) = γSniS + γWniW , or in a quadratic way: B(niS, niW ,xi) =
γ1SniS+γ2Sn
2
iS+γ1WniW+γ2Wn
2
iW+γSWniSniW ; and (3) bias depending on connections and
other observables: B(niS, niW ,xi) = (γ0S+γSxi)niS+(γ0W +γWxi)niW +γ2Sn
2
iS+γ2Wn
2
iW +
γSWniSniW . Quadratic terms help capture decreasing marginal impacts of additional links.
For instance in the quadratic variant of formulation (2), a new strong tie with the jury
increases bias by γ1S +γ2S for an unconnected candidate and by γ1S + 3γ2S for a candidate
who already had one strong tie.
VI Empirical Analysis
A Main results
We develop our empirical analysis in three stages. We first estimate a version of the simple
model discussed in Section II, where the extent of information and favors are constant.
We then account for the number and types of links, holding both effects independent of
observables. Finally, we estimate a model with full dependence on links and observables.
We first examine the impact of having at least one connection of any kind to the jury. We
estimate constant favors and information effects, accounting for baseline heteroscedasticity.
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Denote by ci the connection dummy: ci = 1 if niS + niW ≥ 1 and 0 otherwise. We thus
estimate the following model.
p(yi = 1|xi, ci) = Φ[(xiβ +Bci − ae) exp[−(δxi + δcci)]] (6)
We consider grouped exam effects in our main regressions, and justify this choice in Section
VI.B. Results of the estimation of Model (6) are reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Binary connections: Model (6)
(All) (AP) (FP)
Bias (connected) 0.179∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(0.055) (0.084) (0.091)
Information (connected) 0.174∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.072
(0.055) (0.069) (0.090)
Observations 31243 17799 13444
Notes: All specifications include controls for the full set of observable characteristics, expected number
of connections of each type, and the baseline heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedastic probit estimates. Exam
grouped effects. Standard errors clustered on the exam level are in the parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
On the whole sample, both the estimated bias from favors B and the estimated infor-
mation effect δc are positive and statistically significant. They are also both positive and
significant when estimated on promotions to Associate Professor. By contrast, we detect
favors but no information effect on promotions to Full Professor. Thus, connected candi-
dates appear to face lower promotion thresholds at both levels and connected candidates to
Associate Professor have excess variance in their latent errors. In other words, observable
characteristics have lower power to explain promotion decisions in their case.14
Are these effects quantitatively significant? How much do connections help? And how
much each motive contributes to the overall impact? To answer these questions, we com-
pute for each candidate the predicted impact of a change in his connection status. We
focus, for clarity, on unconnected candidates with at least one link to potential evaluators.
These computations could easily be replicated on other subsamples. Consider, then, un-
14For clarity, we do not report estimates of the impact of candidates’ and exams’ characteristics on
promotion (β) and on baseline variance (δ) in the Tables.
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connected candidate i. Model (6) can be used to predict how much i’s probability to be
promoted would change if i became connected. Denote estimated coefficients with hats.
The difference in predicted promotion probabilities is equal to:
∆pi/∆ci = p(yi = 1|xi, ci = 1)− p(yi = 1|xi, ci = 0)
∆pi/∆ci = Φ[(xiβˆ + Bˆ − aˆe) exp[−(δˆxi + δˆc)]]− Φ[(xiβˆ − aˆe) exp[−(δˆxi)]]
We can further decompose the overall impact of a change in connection status in two parts:
one due to favors [∆pi/∆ci]
F = Φ[(xiβˆ + Bˆ − aˆe) exp[−(δˆxi)]]− Φ[(xiβˆ − aˆe) exp[−(δˆxi)]]
and another due to information [∆pi/∆ci]
I = Φ[(xiβˆ+ Bˆ− aˆe) exp[−(δˆxi+ δˆc)]]−Φ[(xiβˆ+
Bˆ− aˆe) exp[−δˆxi].15 Thus, ∆pi/∆ci = [∆pi/∆ci]F +[∆pi/∆ci]I .16 Finally, we compute the
averages of these values over all individuals in the sample.
We depict the results of these counterfactual computations in Table 5 and Figure 2. The
Table reports averages of initial predicted probability (first column), the average predicted
change in promotion probability due to connection (second column), the part of this change
due to information (third column) and the part to due to favors (fourth column). Thus,
an unconnected candidate with some link to potential evaluators only has, on average, a
0.08 chance to be promoted, reflecting the highly competitive nature of these promotions.
Getting, by luck, connected to the jury leads to a relative increase in the promotion prob-
ability of 80%. This relative impact is higher for candidates at the Associate Professor
level (+91%) than for candidates at the Full Professor level (+76%).17 The larger part of
this effect is due to information for AP candidates (63% of the total impact). By contrast,
favors is the main determinant of this impact for FP candidates (71% of the total im-
pact). Overall, these numbers provide a quantitative picture of the impact of connections.
Getting connected to the jury almost doubles the chances to obtain the promotion. Consis-
15We assume that the exam’s promotion threshold ae is not affected by the change in connection status
of candidate i.
16There are two ways to decompose the overall effect in two parts. Due to non-linearities, these two ways
may not be equivalent. In practice they yield similar results, however, and we only present results from
the decomposition described in the text.
17To compute the impact of connectedness for a subsample, we rely on estimates of Model (6) for this
subsample as presented in Table 4.
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Table 5: Marginal effect of connections: Model (6)
Baseline Marginal effect
Predicted Total Information Bias
All 0.080 0.064 0.035 0.029
(0.069) (0.023) (0.008) (0.019)
AP 0.088 0.080 0.050 0.030
(0.072) (0.024) (0.011) (0.019)
FP 0.063 0.048 0.014 0.034
(0.058) (0.024) (0.003) (0.022)
Notes: Average marginal effect of being connected calculated for unconnected candidates with at least one
connection to potential evaluators. Standard deviation of the effect is in the parenthesis.
tently with the estimation results, favors appear to dominate for FP candidates while the
information effect dominates for AP candidates. Figure 2 then depicts how the change
in predicted probability ∆pi/∆ci, and its two components [∆pi/∆ci]
F and [∆pi/∆ci]
I vary
with predicted probability pi = Φ[(xiβˆ − aˆe) exp[−(δˆxi)]]. We see that [∆pi/∆ci]I has an
inverted U-shape, reaching a maximum for pi close to 0.1 and becoming negative for high
values of pi. By contrast, [∆pi/∆ci]
F is initially increasing over a larger range and only de-
creases - when it does - for high values of pi. These qualitative patterns are consistent with
Figure 1. In particular, and as discussed in Section III, better information on candidates
appears to lower the promotion probabiltiy of candidates with very good CVs. On average
for these candidates, the impact of bad news dominates the impact of good news. Overall,
∆pi/∆ci displays a clear inverted U shape for AP candidates, reaching a maximum around
pi equal to 0.2, due to the key role of the information effect. By contrast, FP candidates
with better observable characteristics benefit more from being connected to the jury.
We next assume that the bias from favors and the information effect may depend on the
number and types of links. We estimate a model with linear bias and log-linear variance:
p(yi = 1|xi, niS, niW ) = Φ[(xiβ + γSniS + γWniW − ae) exp[−(δxi + δSniS + δWniW )]] (7)
as well as a model with quadratic bias and log-linear variance:
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p(yi = 1|xi, niS, niW ) = Φ[(xiβ + γ1SniS + γ2Sn2iS + γ1WniW+
γ2Wn
2
iW + γSWniSniW − ae) exp[−(δxi + δSniS + δWniW )]
(8)
Results are reported in Table 6. In the Left panel we report estimation results from Model
(7). On the whole sample, the bias and information effects from strong ties are both
positive and significant; they are positive but insignificant for weak ties. For Full Professor
applications, we detect favors and information effects from strong ties and, in addition,
favors from weak ties. For Associate Professor applications, we do not detect favors in this
specification; we do detect strongly significant and positive information effects for both
strong and weak ties. Note that in general, the effects of weak ties tend to be imprecisely
Figure 2: Marginal effect of being connected: Decomposition
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Notes: Nonparametric fit using LOESS method. The grey region depicts 95% confidence intervals. Plots
are constructed using estimated model (6) on subsamples indicated above each plot.
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estimated on the subsample of AP applications. This is due to the fact that candidates at
this level have, on average, relatively few weak ties (see Table 2). In the Right panel of
Table 6, we report estimation results from Model (8). Quadratic effects in bias matter and
change overall estimation results. At the FP level, we now do not detect any information
effect. By contrast, we still detect favors from both strong and weak ties. In addition, the
marginal impact of an additional tie on the promotion threshold is decreasing in both cases.
At the AP level, we now detect favors from strong ties and the bias is also increasing and
concave in the number of ties. Information effects for both kinds of ties are positive and
significant, and particularly so for weak ties.
Table 6: Estimation of Model (7) and Model (8)
(All) (AP) (FP) (All) (AP) (FP)
Bias
nS 0.123
∗∗∗ 0.071 0.120∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.070) (0.068) (0.047) (0.072) (0.061)
n2S −0.051∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.014) (0.006)
nW 0.038 −0.338 0.141∗∗ 0.096 −0.170 0.238∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.230) (0.058) (0.073) (0.280) (0.067)
n2W −0.026∗ −0.293 −0.028∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.240) (0.010)
nS × nW 0.018 0.157 −0.011
(0.025) (0.121) (0.021)
Information
nS 0.157
∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.095
(0.044) (0.055) (0.064) (0.040) (0.051) (0.061)
nW 0.077 0.436
∗∗∗ −0.045 0.065 0.519∗∗∗ −0.095
(0.068) (0.150) (0.059) (0.065) (0.153) (0.061)
Observations: 31243 17799 13444 31243 17799 13444
Notes: Estimation of Model (7) - Left panel, and Model (8) - Right panel. All specifications include
controls for the full set of observable characteristics, expected number of connections of each type, and
the baseline heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedastic probit estimates. Exam grouped effects. Standard errors
clustered on the exam level are in the parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
To sum up, strong connections to the jury lower the promotion threshold effectively
faced by connected candidates. This impact is increasing in the number of strong ties at
a decreasing rate. For applications to Full Professor, weak connections to the jury also
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lower the promotion threshold in a similar way. For applications to Associate Professor, we
face a problem of statistical power caused by the relatively low number of weak ties. Both
kinds of ties also appear to convey better information on candidates at the AP level. By
contrast, we do not detect robust information effects at FP level.
We next present the outcomes of counterfactual computations on the impact of connec-
tions in Table 7, based on Model (8). We now focus on unconnected candidates who have
at least one strong tie and one weak tie to potential evaluators. For each such candidate,
we compute the predicted promotion probability and the predicted increase in promotion
probability caused by obtaining, by luck, one strong or weak connection to the jury. We
also provide decompositions of these impacts into parts due to better information and to
favors. We then average over all candidates in the subsample. We see that one strong
tie increases the promotion probability by 74% for AP candidates and by 72% for FP
candidates. By contrast, one weak tie increases the promotion probability by 51% for AP
candidates and by 22% for FP candidates. Thus, strong ties have higher predicted im-
pacts than weak ties. For FP candidates, favors dominate, quantitatively, for both weak
and strong ties. For AP candidates, favors dominate for strong ties and information effects
dominate for weak ties, consistently with the estimation results.
Table 7: Marginal effect of connections: Model (8)
Baseline Marginal effect
Predicted Total Information Bias
Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak
All 0.082 0.060 0.023 0.019 0.012 0.041 0.011
(0.068) (0.026) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.024) (0.007)
AP 0.091 0.067 0.046 0.028 0.092 0.039 -0.046
(0.072) (0.025) (0.023) (0.006) (0.026) (0.023) (0.031)
FP 0.068 0.049 0.015 0.019 -0.017 0.030 0.033
(0.058) (0.021) (0.017) (0.004) (0.005) (0.018) (0.020)
Notes: Average marginal effects of strong and weak connections calculated for unconnected candidates
with at least one strong connection and one weak connection to potential evaluators. Standard deviation
of the effect is in the parenthesis.
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These results essentially conform to intuition. We would a priori expect strong ties to
induce favors. We would also expect uncertainty on candidates’ true ability to be stronger
at the Associate Professor level, consistently with the stronger information effects detected
at that level. The fact that weak ties generate stronger information effects is also consis-
tent with the classical view of the role played by weak ties in information transmission
Granovetter (1973). One finding that is, perhaps, surprising is the fact that weak ties
appear to generate favors at the Full Professor level. Note that candidates at that level
have been in the academic system for a relatively long time. They have likely had more
opportunities to initiate favor exchange. Overall, these findings indicate that the Spanish
academic system was likely subject to generalized favoritism.
These results are also consisent with - and help sharpen - the findings of Zinovyeva &
Bagues (2015, Section IV.D.) derived from data collected 5 years after promotion. They
find that research outcomes after promotion are lower for promoted candidates with strong
ties than for promoted candidates without, considering the whole sample and controlling
for observables at time of promotion. Promoted candidates with strong ties publish less, in
lower quality journals, supervise less PhD students and participate in less PhD committees.
Authors state: “Our preferred interpretation of the empirical evidence is that candidates
with a strong connection may have enjoyed preferential treatment, which overshadows the
potential informational advantages of strong links.” By contrast, weak ties to the jury
do not yield detectable differences in research outcomes of promoted candidates. For AP
candidates, promoted candidates with weak ties are more likely to eventually be promoted
to full professor than promoted candidates without weak ties.
Our empirical results, obtained from promotion data only, are consistent with these
findings. On the whole sample, we clearly detect favors from strong ties. For AP candidates,
we also detect information effects from weak ties. In addition, our method allow us to
deepen the empirical analysis. We can detect both effects and precisely quantify their
respective roles. We find, in particular, evidence of information effects from strong ties on
the whole sample and no evidence of favors associated with weak ties for AP candidates.
Finally, we assume that the bias from favors and the excess variance due to better
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information may depend on observables. We estimate the following model:
p(yi =1|xi, niS, niW ) = Φ[(xiβ + (γ0S + γSxi)niS + (γ0W + γWxi)niW + γ2Sn2iS
+ γ2Wn
2
iW + γSWniSniW − ae) exp[−(δxi + (δSxi)niS + (δWxi)niW )]]
(9)
We present estimation results in the Appendix, see Table A1 for AP candidates and Table
A2 for FP candidates. A positive coefficient of the impact of some characteristic on bias
means that favors due to connections tend to be stronger for candidates with higher values
of this characteristic. Similarly, a positive coefficient on the information effect means that
excess variance, and hence the quality of the extra information brought about by an addi-
tional connection, is higher for these candidates. Results are rich and complex and confirm
that we can detect variations in the effects of connections. For instance, AP candidates
having obtained their PhD in Spain appear to have higher information effects from both
weak and strong ties and lower bias from weak ties. Results on information are consistent
with the idea that having obtained a PhD abroad provides an informative signal on a
candidate’s ability. We present counterfactual computations obtained from Model (9) in
Table 8. Comparing with Table 7, we see that predicted probabilities are quantitatively
similar.
Table 8: Marginal effect of connections: Model (9)
Baseline Marginal effect
Predicted Total Information Bias
Strong Weak Strong Weak Strong Weak
AP 0.090 0.078 0.055 0.032 0.066 0.047 -0.012
(0.067) (0.037) (0.052) (0.021) (0.067) (0.030) (0.044)
FP 0.066 0.058 0.017 0.011 -0.003 0.047 0.020
(0.056) (0.036) (0.027) (0.025) (0.039) (0.028) (0.026)
Notes: Average marginal effects of strong and weak connections calculated for unconnected candidates
with at least one strong connection and one weak connection to potential evaluators. Standard deviation
of the effect is in the parenthesis.
The average marginal impacts of gaining one strong or weak link to the jury for uncon-
nected candidates appear to be slightly lower under Model (9) than under Model (8). This
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means that unconnected candidates have, on average, observable characteristics for which
connections’ impacts are slightly weaker. Strong ties still have higher predicted impacts
than weak ties. And the relative quantitative importance of the two factors is robust. Fa-
vors dominate for strong and weak ties at the FP level and for strong ties at the AP level.
By contrast, information effects dominates for weak ties at the AP level.
B Robustness
In this section, we explore variations in the specification of two important features of the
econometric model: exam-specific promotion thresholds and baseline variance. First, we
contrast estimations with exam fixed effects ae and exam grouped effects ae = zea. We
compare estimation results of Model (6) under the two specifications in Table 9. The first
Table 9: Exam fixed effects vs. Exam grouped effects: Model (6)
All AP FP
FE GE FE GE FE GE
Bias 0.304∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.074 0.208∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗
(0.088) (0.055) (0.078) (0.084) (0.097) (0.091)
Information 0.166∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.013 0.072
(0.053) (0.055) (0.064) (0.069) (0.065) (0.090)
LogLik -9766.6 -9965.2 -5773.2 -5847.3 -3931.7 -4064.9
df 989 98 486 61 523 61
LR - 396.68 - 148.13 - 266.37
Observations 31243 31243 17799 17799 13444 13444
Notes: The row LR reports the value of LR statistics of comparison of the restricted model (GE) and
the unrestricted model (FE) in the preceding column. Heteroskedastic probit estimates. Standard errors
clustered on the exam level are in the parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
column reports results of fixed effects estimations; the second column duplicates the results
from Table 4. We see that the sign and statistical significance of both effects are similar
for both specifications on the whole sample and on the subsample of FP candidates. On
AP candidates, the information effect also has similar sign and significance. Bias from
favors is positive and significant in the restricted model but positive and insignificant in
the unrestricted model. Results from likelihood ratio tests show that we cannot reject the
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hypothesis that the grouped effects specification describes the data as well as the one with
fixed effects, on each subsample as well as on the whole sample. We therefore consider
grouped effects in our main regressions.
Second, we consider different specifications of baseline variance σv(xi). We contrast
estimations under homoscedasticity, when all individual characteristics are included, and
when a subset of characteristics are included, as described in the Appendix. Results are
depicted in Table 10 for Model (6) and Table 11 in Model (7). We see that the sign and
statistical significance of the main effects are essentially similar for the last two specifica-
tions on the whole sample and on each subsample. Likelihood ratio tests also show that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the parsimonious specification describes the data as well
as the full-fledged specification, even on subsamples. By contrast, estimates of main effects
differ under homoscedasticity and the homoscedastic specification is rejected by likelihood
ratio test. This confirms the importance of properly accounting for baseline heteroscedas-
ticity. For reasons of computational and statistical efficiency, we therefore adopt the more
parsimonious heteroscedasticy specification in our main regressions.
Table 10: Robustness: Baseline heteroskedasticity: Model (6)
All AP FP
Hom. Preferred Full Hom. Preferred Full Hom. Preferred Full
Bias 0.419∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.398∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗ 0.173∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.055) (0.064) (0.076) (0.084) (0.095) (0.096) (0.091) (0.072)
Information −0.020 0.174∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.055 0.245∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ −0.052 0.072 0.060
(0.052) (0.055) (0.058) (0.066) (0.069) (0.077) (0.083) (0.090) (0.089)
LogLik -10052.3 -9965.2 -9958.8 -5906.0 -5847.3 -5844.4 -4089.6 -4064.9 -4059.6
df 88 98 109 52 61 69 52 61 69
LR - 174.19∗∗∗ 12.72 - 117.53∗∗∗ 5.71 - 49.42∗∗∗ 10.62
Observations 31243 31243 31243 17799 17799 17799 13444 13444 13444
Notes: The row LR reports the value of LR statistics of comparison of the unrestricted model with the
restricted model in the preceding column. Heteroskedastic probit estimates. Standard errors clustered on
the exam level are in the parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 11: Robustness: Baseline heteroskedasticity: Model (7)
All AP FP
Hom. Preferred Full Hom. Preferred Full Hom. Preferred Full
Bias (strong) 0.221∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.071 0.055 0.236∗∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.066
(0.037) (0.047) (0.051) (0.052) (0.070) (0.067) (0.051) (0.068) (0.061)
Bias (weak) 0.031 0.038 0.046 −0.093 −0.338 −0.369 0.085∗ 0.141∗∗ 0.135∗∗
(0.055) (0.069) (0.077) (0.174) (0.230) (0.228) (0.046) (0.058) (0.054)
Information (strong) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.066 0.142∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.055) (0.057) (0.044) (0.064) (0.066)
Information (weak) 0.089∗∗ 0.077 0.074 0.280∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.021 −0.045 −0.059
(0.040) (0.068) (0.067) (0.129) (0.150) (0.154) (0.036) (0.059) (0.060)
LogLik -10033.4 -9949.9 -9943.4 -5910.1 -5854.9 -5851.1 -4064.2 -4041.0 -4037.4
df 90 100 111 54 63 71 54 63 71
LR - 166.91∗∗∗ 13.01 - 110.26∗∗∗ 7.70 - 46.34∗∗∗ 7.08
Observations 31243 31243 31243 17799 17799 17799 13444 13444 13444
Notes: The row LR reports the value of LR statistics of comparison of the unrestricted model with the
restricted model in the preceding column. Heteroskedastic probit estimates. Standard errors clustered on
the exam level are in the parenthesis. ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
VII Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, we propose a new method to identify favors and information in the impact
of connections, building on earlier work on discrimination. Our method combines natural
experiments and semi-structural modelling. It requires exogenous shocks on connections
and only exploits information collected at time of promotion. We develop an economet-
ric framework based on probit regressions with heteroscedasticity. Our method can thus
be implemented using standard statistical softwares. We show that better information on
connected candidates yields excess variance in latent errors. Differences in estimated vari-
ances between connected and unconnected candidates can be used to identify and quantify
the information effect. Differences in estimated promotion thresholds can then be used to
identify the bias due to favors. We apply our method to the data assembled and studied in
Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015). Our empirical results are consistent with, and help sharpen,
findings obtained from data collected five years after promotion.
Our framework relies on a number of assumptions and, in particular, latent error nor-
mality, deterministic favors and jury risk-neutrality. We next discuss the robustness of
our approach to relaxing these assumptions. First, we conjecture that this method can
be extended to non-normal latent errors. The fact that better private information leads to
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excess variance is quite general, as shown by Lu (2016). It could be interesting, in future
research, to try and extend this framework to logit or even non-parametric regressions.
Second, suppose that favors are stochastic. Bias from favors is the sum of a deterministic
part and a stochastic part. If the stochastic part is independent of connections, our analysis
and results goes through without modifications. This stochastic part is simply subsumed
in the latent error. Our approach must be modified, however, if the bias’ stochastic part is
affected by connections. Current estimates of the information effect provide a lower bound
of the true effect if bias variance decreases with connections and an upper bound if it
increases with connections.
Third, consider a risk-averse jury. Risk aversion might lead the jury to promote a can-
didate with lower expected ability if the uncertainty on her ability is lower. In other words,
the grade of candidates evaluated by a risk averse jury may contain a risk penalty. This
may invalidate the identification of favors. Note that it also invalidates the identification
of favors in studies based on quality measures. For instance, Zinovyeva & Bagues (2015)’s
finding that promoted candidates with strong ties publish less in the 5 years after promo-
tion could also be explained by risk aversion. Interestingly, however, we suspect that the
identification of the information effect might be robust to risk aversion. Developing empiri-
cal methods to identify risk aversion, favors and information effects provides an interesting
challenge for future research.
To sum up, our method exploits variations in latent error variance and in promotion
thresholds with connections. We clarify the conditions under which these variations yield
identification of favors and information in the impact of connections. Even in circum-
stances when identification does not hold, however, these estimates may contain valuable
information on why connections matter.
Finally, it would be interesting to combine our method with quality measures. This
could, potentially, yield more precise estimates of favors and information effects and also
allow researchers to test critical assumptions, such as whether promotion indeed has the
same impact on quality for connected and unconnected candidates.
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 1 A model with bias B(.) and excess variance σ(.) and an alter-
native model with bias B′(.) and σ′(.) yield the same conditional probability to be hired
p(yi = 1|niS, niW ,xi) if
xiβ +B(niS, niW ,xi)− ae
σv(xi)σ(niS, niW ,xi)
=
xiβ +B
′(niS, niW ,xi)− ae
σv(xi)σ′(niS, niW ,xi)
Therefore, for any functions B(.), B′(.) and σ(.), a model based on B(.) and σ(.) and
one based on B′(.) and
σ′(niS, niW ,xi) =
xiβ +B
′(niS, niW ,xi)− ae
xiβ +B(niS, niW ,xi)− ae σ(niS, niW ,xi)
have the same empirical implications. QED.
Proof of Theorem 1 Consider first the classical Probit model with heteroscedasticity:
p(yi = 1|xi) = Φ[(a+ bxi) exp(−cxi)]
Let us show that this model is identified if ab 6= 0.18 Identification holds if the mapping
from parameters to the population distribution of outcomes is injective. Consider two sets
of parameters a,b, c and a′,b′, c′ such that ∀x ∈ Rk, Φ[(a + bx) exp(−cx)] = Φ[(a′ +
b′x) exp(−c′x)]. We must show that a = a′, b = b′ and c = c′.
Applying Φ−1 yields: ∀x, (a + bx) exp(−cx) = (a′ + b′x) exp(−c′x). At x = 0, this
yields: a = a′. Next, take the derivative with respect to xk and apply at x = 0. This yields
bk − ack = b′k − ac′k. Observe also that bk and b′k must have the same sign. Indeed if xl = 0
when l 6= k, then (a+bx) exp(−cx) = (a+bkxk) exp(−ckxk). As xk goes from −∞ to +∞,
the sign of this expression can vary in one of three ways: it goes from negative to positive
if bk > 0; it goes from positive to negative if bk < 0; or it stays constant if bk = 0.
Assume first that a 6= 0 and b 6= 0. Consider k such that bk 6= 0, for instance bk > 0.
Set xl = 0 except if l 6= k. For any xk large enough, a + bx = a + bkxk > 0. Taking logs
yields: ln(a + bkxk)− ckxk = ln(a + b′kxk)− c′kxk. Take the derivative with respect to xk:
bk/(a+ bkxk)− ck = b′k/(a+ b′kxk)− c′k. Take the derivative twice more: b2k/(a+ bkxk)2 =
b′2k /(a+ b
′
kxk)
2 and −2b3k/(a+ bkxk)3 = −2b′3k /(a+ b′kxk)3. Since this holds for any xk large
enough, this must hold for any xk. At xk = 0, this yields: b
3
k = b
′3
k and hence bk = b
′
k and
ck = c
′
k. If bk = 0, then b
′
k = 0 and ck = c
′
k.
Assume next that b = 0. Then b′ = 0 and ∀x, a exp(−cx) = a exp(−c′x) and hence
c = c′. Finally, if a = 0 and bk > 0, then for any xk > 0, ln(bkxk)− ckxk = ln(b′kxk)− c′kxk
and hence ln(bk) − ckxk = ln(b′k) − c′kxk. This implies that bk = b′k and ck = c′k. Thus,
b = b′ and cx = c′x for any x such that bx 6= 0, which implies that c = c′.
Observe that injectivity and identification also hold if x belongs to an open set O of
Rk. The reason is that the function x → (a + bx) exp(−cx) is analytic and that two
analytic functions which are equal on an open set must be equal everywhere. Therefore,
18If a = 0 and b = 0, ∀x, Φ[(a+ bx) exp(−cx)] = 1/2 and c is not identified.
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∀x ∈ O, Φ[(a+ bx) exp(−cx)] = Φ[(a′+ b′x) exp(−c′x)]⇒ ∀x ∈ Rk, (a+ bx) exp(−cx) =
(a′ + b′x) exp(−c′x) and hence a = a′, b = b′ and c = c′.
Identification also holds if with some binary characteristics. Suppose that x1i ∈ {0, 1}
and denote by x−1i ∈ Rk−1, the vector of other characteristics. Then, p(yi = 1|x1i =
0,x−1i ) = Φ[(a+b
−1xi) exp(−c−1xi)] yielding identification of a,b−1 and c−1. Next, p(yi =
1|x1i = 1,x−1i ) = Φ[(a + b1 + b−1xi) exp(−c1 − c−1xi)]. Rewrite Φ−1(p) = [e−c1(a + b1) +
e−c
1
b−1xi exp](−c−1xi). Therefore, e−c1b−1 is identified and hence c1 is identified. Since
e−c
1
(a+ b1) is also identified, b1 is identified.
Thus n becomes arbitrarily large, the econometrician can thus obtain consistent esti-
mates of a,b and c if observables have full rank.
Consider, next, the following model
p(yi = 1|niS, niW ,xi) = Φ[((β+γ1(niS, niW ))xi+γ0(niS, niW )−ae] exp[−(δ+δ(niS, niW ))xi]
We apply the identification result on the Probit model with heteroscedascticity repeatedly.
On unconnected candidates, we have: p(yi = 1|niS = 0, niW = 0,xi) = Φ(βxi−ae) exp(−δ)
and hence ae, β, and δ are identified. Similarly for candidates with connections niS and
niW , the parameters γ0(niS, niW ) − ae, β + γ1(niS, niW ) and δ + δ(niS, niW ) are identi-
fied. Therefore, γ0(niS, niW ), γ1(niS, niW ), and δ(niS, niW ) are identified. Note that to
obtain consisent estimates of ae, β, δ, γ0(niS, niW ), γ1(niS, niW ), δ(niS, niW ), the number
of observations within exams must become arbitrarily large and observables conditional on
(niS, niW ) must have full rank. QED.
Preferred specification for the baseline heteroscedasticity. We first estimate model
(4) on unconnected candidates, under the assumption that latent error variance is log-linear
and depends on all observable characteristics. We thus estimate the following model:
p(yi = 1|xi) = Φ[(xiβ − ae) exp(−δxi)]
on unconnected candidates. In our preferred specification for σv, we then include variables
that are statistically insignificant as well expected numbers of connections EniS, EniW .
We include these expected numbers given their critical role in ensuring the exogeneity
of actual connections. We exclude other variables. Our preferred specification includes the
following 10 observables: expected number of strong connections, expected number of weak
connections, PhD students advised, AIS, age, gender, number of candidates at the exam,
share of unconnected candidates at the exam, type of exam, and the indicator if the broad
area is Humanities and Law. As discussed in Section VI.B. and following Davidson &
McKinnon (1984), we also test whether this restricted model indeed explains the data as
well as the non-restricted model.
Additional estimation results. Results of the estimation of Model (9) for subsamples
of AP candidates and FP candidates are presented in Table A1 and Table A2 respectively.
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Table A1: Estimation of Model (9): AP candidates
Bias Information
Strong Weak Strong Weak
Const. 0.466∗∗ 0.587∗∗ - -
(0.185) (0.245) - -
Strong −0.075∗∗∗ 0.020 - -
(0.026) (0.128) - -
Weak 0.020 -0.141 - -
(0.128) (0.134) - -
Publications 0.016 0.033 −0.061∗∗ 0.025
(0.012) (0.128) (0.025) (0.119)
PhD Committees 0.020∗∗∗ -0.002 −0.017 −0.023
(0.007) (0.092) (0.028) (0.068)
AIS −0.009 0.103 0.063∗∗ −0.089
(0.016) (0.114) (0.029) (0.136)
PhD students 0.043∗∗ 0.086 0.078∗∗ 0.016
(0.019) (0.094) (0.037) (0.081)
Female −0.009 0.423∗∗ 0.004 −0.452∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.215) (0.041) (0.164)
PhD in Spain −0.113 −0.650∗∗ 0.170∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.281) (0.068) (0.174)
Age −0.004 0.001 −0.004 −0.010
(0.002) (0.017) (0.004) (0.014)
Past experience −0.007 -0.156 0.037 0.222
(0.024) (0.176) (0.025) (0.135)
Expected strong 0.030 -0.168 −0.102∗∗∗ 0.060
(0.027) (0.189) (0.028) (0.150)
Expected weak 0.309 -0.415 0.180 −0.165
(0.233) (0.389) (0.278) (0.280)
Notes: Estimation of Model (9). All specifications include controls for the full set of observable character-
istics, expected number of connections of each type, and the baseline heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedastic
probit estimates. Exam grouped effects. Standard errors clustered on the exam level are in the parenthesis.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table A2: Estimation of Model (9): FP candidates
Bias Information
Strong Weak Strong Weak
Const. 0.366∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ - -
(0.065) (0.058) - -
Strong −0.058∗∗∗ −0.044 - -
(0.017) (0.035) - -
Weak −0.044 −0.021 - -
(0.035) (0.017) - -
Publications −0.054 0.037∗∗ 0.071 −0.061∗∗
(0.036) (0.019) (0.051) (0.028)
PhD Committees 0.007 0.038∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.037
(0.007) (0.020) (0.027) (0.026)
AIS 0.078∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ −0.057 −0.118∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.034) (0.047) (0.037)
PhD Students −0.008 −0.061∗∗ 0.013 0.041
(0.010) (0.024) (0.020) (0.025)
Female 0.017 0.005 0.021 0.009
(0.025) (0.046) (0.047) (0.055)
PhD in Spain −0.009 0.064 0.085∗∗ −0.010
(0.013) (0.040) (0.039) (0.049)
Age 0.003∗∗ 0.002 −0.012∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Past experience −0.001 −0.041 −0.018 0.108∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.027) (0.025) (0.036)
Expected strong 0.048∗∗ 0.006 −0.069∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.022) (0.035) (0.012) (0.067)
Expected weak 0.019 −0.005 0.021 −0.117∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.031) (0.071) (0.034)
Notes: Estimation of Model (9). All specifications include controls for the full set of observable character-
istics, expected number of connections of each type, and the baseline heteroskedasticity. Heteroskedastic
probit estimates. Exam grouped effects. Standard errors clustered on the exam level are in the parenthesis.
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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